Admin two-factor authentication device is lost or compromised accepted Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT1
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:28
- Risk
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium (unchanged)
An adversary that has compromised the admin's two factor token can obtain local, physical console access with app and mon server passwords. In combination with the Tor hidden service cookie and the admin's password, an adversary may be able to access the Journalist interface.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Passphrases for journalists and admins are generated to be 7 word diceware MITIG49 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Admin guide explains incident response when 2FA seed is compromised MITIG218 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
Residual risk
Risk is accepted
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
- Admin Workstation (device) Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Workstation lifecycle and backups Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Admin Workstation (device)
Notes
Existing mitigations: 7-word diceware password is also needed to log into admin account (MITIG49). Further mitigations: Admin/Journalists should be instructed to immediately notify SecureDrop admin of a lost 2FA token to rotate seeds immediately (MITIG218). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.