Admin activity compromised physical surveillance (e.g.: video camera) partially mitigated Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT103
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:1792
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
An adversary directly observes admin keystrokes or activity through visual surveillance such as cameras or shouldersurfing
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| SSH password auth disabled, requires key MITIG20 | implemented |
| Tor onion creds stored in file, rarely displayed on screen (not really a mitigation... ) MITIG131 Legacy (Tails/SVS) | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- 2FA access for SecureDrop servers MITIG127 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
Residual risk
Candidate for further mitigation efforts.
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
- Admin Workstation (device) Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Workstation lifecycle and backups Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Admin Workstation (device)
Notes
Existing mitigations: SSH authentication is key-based, only the passphrase could be observed (MITIG20). Tor hidden service cookie is in a config file and cannot be easily observed (MITIG131). Further mitigations: Console access requires 2-Factor authentication, which can only be eavesdropped at enroll-time (MITIG127). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.