Admin key sent by (smail) mail and intercepted partially mitigated Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT106
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:1844
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
An adversary that Interdicts/intercepts/tampers with the Admin key sent by mail attempt could image the drive or directly decrypt contents, or replace the contents of the drive with malware.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Persistent FDE Storage of Admin Tails Key MITIG58 Legacy (Tails/SVS) | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- SOP for transferring admin keys and credentials MITIG133 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
Residual risk
Candidate for further mitigation efforts.
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
- Admin Workstation (device) Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Workstation lifecycle and backups Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Admin Workstation (device)
Notes
Existing mitigations: Admin key persistence volume is encrypted with LUKS/dm-crypt (MITIG58). Further mitigations: Admin key should be sent by a trusted courier (e.g.: organization employee) in a tamper-evident bag, encrypted with a passphrase that is not known by this employee. Persistent volume passphrase should be shared in-person or via end-to-end encrypted ephemeral communication (e.g. Signal with disappearing messages and verified safety numbers) (MITIG133). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.