Admin key sent by (smail) mail and intercepted partially mitigated Legacy (Tails/SVS)

THREAT106 · Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high. · Defined in catalog.py:1844

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

An adversary that Interdicts/intercepts/tampers with the Admin key sent by mail attempt could image the drive or directly decrypt contents, or replace the contents of the drive with malware.

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Persistent FDE Storage of Admin Tails Key MITIG58 Legacy (Tails/SVS) implemented

Possible further mitigations

Residual risk

Candidate for further mitigation efforts.

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.

Workstation lifecycle and backups Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Admin Workstation (device)

Notes

Existing mitigations: Admin key persistence volume is encrypted with LUKS/dm-crypt (MITIG58). Further mitigations: Admin key should be sent by a trusted courier (e.g.: organization employee) in a tamper-evident bag, encrypted with a passphrase that is not known by this employee. Persistent volume passphrase should be shared in-person or via end-to-end encrypted ephemeral communication (e.g. Signal with disappearing messages and verified safety numbers) (MITIG133). Automated test for mitigation: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.