Data protection vulnerability in Source interface mitigated

THREAT12 · Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level. · Defined in catalog.py:219

Risk
Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium
After mitigations
Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

Improper data protection may lead to information being leaked by the client.

Threat actors: Any

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Secure Temporary Wrapper to stream submissions encrypted on disk MITIG69 implemented
Use of strong encryption key for encrypted documents MITIG11 implemented
Logging off for source interface MITIG41 implemented
Source interface: Cache-Control nostore MITIG204 implemented
Sensitive data sent in POST requests MITIG205 implemented

Possible further mitigations

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.

Source submission · Source Interface
Supply chain and dependencies · Source Interface

Notes

Existing mitigations: All are encrypted at rest using GPG with the airgapped submission key once the requests hits the server (MITIG69, MITIG11). Sensitive information (source information, submission information) is not logged (MITIG41). Cache-control header set to "no-store" (MITIG204). All sensitive data is sent through HTTP POST (MITIG205). Further mitigations: Disable autocompletion for source codename. End-to-end encryption of submissions either through or SecureDrop application in Tails/Tor Browser (MITIG140). Timestamps on files could be rounded: https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop/issues/822 (MITIG211). Automated test for mitigation: Yes.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.