Landing page TLS private key compromised partially mitigated
THREAT122
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:2101
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
A compromised TLS key combined with an attacker in a privileged network position (between submitter and landing page) may trivially intercept and modify traffic and landing page contents, including onion address. Attacker may also attempt injection of JavaScript or malware in an attempt to de-anonymize the potential source.
Threat actors: Any
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Landing page deployment guide explains some security best practices for the webserver hosting the onion URL MITIG103 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Alerts sent to admins and FPF when onion URLs change on landing pages (from monitoring via multiple Tor circuits and physical locations) MITIG104 proposed
- securedrop.org directory explains sources should compare the onion URL in the directory with the one on the news org page MITIG105 implemented
Residual risk
Administrator error or omission
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Source discovery and OPSEC · Landing page
Notes
Existing mitigations: Securedrop deployment guide provides guidance on server hardening: https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/deployment_practices.html?page#landing-page (MITIG103). Further mitigations: Source guide should be augmented to suggest a source validate the onion URL of the source interface of the organization with the one on Securedrop.org (or secrdrop5wyphb5x.onion). FPF Landing page scanner could be used to verify the integrity of the page (MITIG104, MITIG105). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.