Landing page TLS private key compromised partially mitigated

THREAT122 · Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high. · Defined in catalog.py:2101

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

A compromised TLS key combined with an attacker in a privileged network position (between submitter and landing page) may trivially intercept and modify traffic and landing page contents, including onion address. Attacker may also attempt injection of JavaScript or malware in an attempt to de-anonymize the potential source.

Threat actors: Any

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Landing page deployment guide explains some security best practices for the webserver hosting the onion URL MITIG103 implemented

Possible further mitigations

Residual risk

Administrator error or omission

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.

Source discovery and OPSEC · Landing page

Notes

Existing mitigations: Securedrop deployment guide provides guidance on server hardening: https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/deployment_practices.html?page#landing-page (MITIG103). Further mitigations: Source guide should be augmented to suggest a source validate the onion URL of the source interface of the organization with the one on Securedrop.org (or secrdrop5wyphb5x.onion). FPF Landing page scanner could be used to verify the integrity of the page (MITIG104, MITIG105). Automated test for mitigation: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.