Submission key is moved to a non-airgapped machine - journalist/admin workstation inform Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT126
· Inform: Handled by telling users how to protect themselves.
· Defined in catalog.py:2170
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
SecureDrop submission key is moved to another (non-airgapped) machine.
Threat actors: Administrator error
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Users instructed not to move the SVS key off the SVS workstation MITIG149 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Store SVS key on Yubikey MITIG150 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
- Admin guide explains incident response when submission key moved out of airgap or compromised MITIG151 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
Residual risk
Candidate for further mitigation efforts
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.
- Secure Viewing Station Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Transfer & decrypt Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station
Publish & export Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station
Notes
Existing mitigations: Users are intructed to keep the submission key on the SVS. https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/generate_securedrop_application_key.html (MITIG149). Further mitigations: Store Submission key on Yubikey or Smartcard device (MITIG150). Recommend users rotate the submission key if they believe the key has been transfered to a non-airgapped machine (MITIG151). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.