Submission key is moved to a non-airgapped machine - journalist/admin workstation inform Legacy (Tails/SVS)

THREAT126 · Inform: Handled by telling users how to protect themselves. · Defined in catalog.py:2170

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

SecureDrop submission key is moved to another (non-airgapped) machine.

Threat actors: Administrator error

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Users instructed not to move the SVS key off the SVS workstation MITIG149 implemented

Possible further mitigations

Residual risk

Candidate for further mitigation efforts

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.

Transfer & decrypt Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station
Publish & export Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station

Notes

Existing mitigations: Users are intructed to keep the submission key on the SVS. https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/generate_securedrop_application_key.html (MITIG149). Further mitigations: Store Submission key on Yubikey or Smartcard device (MITIG150). Recommend users rotate the submission key if they believe the key has been transfered to a non-airgapped machine (MITIG151). Automated test for mitigation: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.