Exfiltration of SVS data through malicious documents partially mitigated Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT128
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:2204
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
Through either compromised or malicious use of the SVS, data could be exfiltrated from the SVS (this includes the Submission Key)
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Use of airgapped SVS key MITIG10 | implemented |
| Journalist guide has cursory explanation of malware risks MITIG153 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Store SVS key on Yubikey MITIG150 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.
- Secure Viewing Station Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Transfer & decrypt Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station
Publish & export Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station
Notes
Existing mitigations: SVS is airgapped (MITIG10). Journalist guide informs users of malware risks when opening submissions on the SVS (https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/journalist.html) (MITIG153). Further mitigations: Yubikey to store submission private key (MITIG150). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.