Exfiltration of SVS data through malicious documents partially mitigated Legacy (Tails/SVS)

THREAT128 · Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high. · Defined in catalog.py:2204

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

Through either compromised or malicious use of the SVS, data could be exfiltrated from the SVS (this includes the Submission Key)

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Use of airgapped SVS key MITIG10 implemented
Journalist guide has cursory explanation of malware risks MITIG153 implemented

Possible further mitigations

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.

Transfer & decrypt Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station
Publish & export Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station

Notes

Existing mitigations: SVS is airgapped (MITIG10). Journalist guide informs users of malware risks when opening submissions on the SVS (https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/journalist.html) (MITIG153). Further mitigations: Yubikey to store submission private key (MITIG150). Automated test for mitigation: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.