Malware on transfer device breaks SVS airgap inform Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT139
· Inform: Handled by telling users how to protect themselves.
· Defined in catalog.py:2393
- Risk
- Medium impact × Medium likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × Medium likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
A malicious submission may extract key material from SVS and be exfiltrated as this file is moved from the SVS to the Journalist workstation and eventually published. A compromised SVS could then inject malware into documents and compromise other machines.
Threat actors: Journalist error
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Possible further mitigations
- Journalist guide should explain airgap and describe how the drive should never be plugged into online workstation MITIG181 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
- Journalist guide has detailed information about removing metadata and handling the malware threat MITIG88 proposed
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
- Transfer Device Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Transfer & decrypt Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Transfer Device
Notes
Further mitigations: Provide further documentation on sanitization and airgap process (MITIG181). Documents should be sanitized on the svs or printed. (MITIG88). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.