Airgapped SVS Tails key tampered accepted Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT153
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:2633
- Risk
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium (unchanged)
An adversary tampers the SVS Tails USB stick and inserts malware
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Persistent storage FDE for SVS MITIG14 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Admin guide explains incident response when submission key moved out of airgap or compromised MITIG151 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
- Tamper-evident stickers/bags MITIG116 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
- Admin guide should speak clearly to physical security considerations MITIG115 proposed
Residual risk
Candidate for further mitigation efforts. Evil maid attack still possible.
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.
- Secure Viewing Station Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Transfer & decrypt Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station
Publish & export Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station
Notes
Existing mitigations: Full disk encryption of persistence volume (MITIG14). Further mitigations: Inform users to immediately discard existing key and change submission key should there be any doubt the SVS Persistent volume passphrase was lost or seized (MITIG151). Tamper-evident storage of SVS key (MITIG116, MITIG115). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.