Airgapped SVS Tails key tampered accepted Legacy (Tails/SVS)

THREAT153 · Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk. · Defined in catalog.py:2633

Risk
Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium
After mitigations
Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

An adversary tampers the SVS Tails USB stick and inserts malware

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Persistent storage FDE for SVS MITIG14 implemented

Possible further mitigations

Residual risk

Candidate for further mitigation efforts. Evil maid attack still possible.

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.

Transfer & decrypt Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station
Publish & export Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Secure Viewing Station

Notes

Existing mitigations: Full disk encryption of persistence volume (MITIG14). Further mitigations: Inform users to immediately discard existing key and change submission key should there be any doubt the SVS Persistent volume passphrase was lost or seized (MITIG151). Tamper-evident storage of SVS key (MITIG116, MITIG115). Automated test for mitigation: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.