Known vulnerabilities in Tor (incl. Onion Service cryptography, authentication) mitigated

THREAT35 · Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level. · Defined in catalog.py:608

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

Known vulnerabilities in the Tor protocol/packages may risk of fingerprinting/eavesdropping on communication or bypassing Tor Hidden Service authentication.

Threat actors: Any

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Nighly security update MITIG165 implemented
Use of grsecurity-hardened kernels on servers MITIG53 implemented
AppArmor on Tor MITIG1 implemented
AppArmor on Apache MITIG2 implemented
Use of OSSEC monitoring software MITIG5 implemented
HidServAuth token on journalist interface MITIG3 implemented
HidServAuth token on SSH MITIG4 optional

Possible further mitigations

Residual risk

In default configuration, SecureDrop's Source and Journalist interfaces do not use HTTPS

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.

Supply chain and dependencies · Tor software

Notes

Existing mitigations: A cron job ensures that automatic nightly security updates are applied for OS packages, including Tor (MITIG165). Grsecurity/PaX linux patches prevent the exploitation of certain memory-corruption attacks (MITIG53). AppArmor profiles further reduce process capabilities through Mandatory Access Control (MITIG1, MITIG2). Ossec is used for intrusion detection/file integrity monitoring (MITIG5). Hidden Service authentication is used as a complementary authentication and only used for defense-in-depth/attack surface reduction (MITIG3, MITIG4). Further mitigations: Use/mandate HTTPS for both Source and Journalist interfaces (MITIG6, MITIG166). Automated test for mitigation: Yes.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.