Unknown vulnerabilities in Tor (incl. Onion Service cryptography, authentication) partially mitigated
THREAT37
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:652
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
Unknown vulnerabilities in Tor may lead to weaknesses in encryption or authentication when users communicate with Tor hidden services.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Use of grsecurity-hardened kernels on servers MITIG53 | implemented |
| AppArmor on Tor MITIG1 | implemented |
| AppArmor on Apache MITIG2 | implemented |
| Use of OSSEC monitoring software MITIG5 | implemented |
| SSH password auth disabled, requires key MITIG20 | implemented |
| Passphrases for journalists and admins are generated to be 7 word diceware MITIG49 | implemented |
| 2FA token required for login to admin or journalist interfaces MITIG19 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Use v3 onion services MITIG168 implemented
- e2e encryption MITIG140 proposed
Residual risk
Risk is accepted.
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Supply chain and dependencies · Tor software
Notes
In scope: No. Existing mitigations: grsecurity/PaX linux patches prevent the exploitation of certain memory-corruption attacks (MITIG53). AppArmor profiles further reduce process capabilities through Mandatory Access Control (MITIG1, MITIG2). OSSEC is used for intrusion detection/file integrity monitoring (MITIG5). Defense-in-depth will protect services exposed/relying on authenticated hidden services: SSH (key-based authentication) (MITIG20), Journalist Interface (username, passphrase, TOTP/Yubikey) (MITIG49, MITIG19). Further mitigations: Move to tor v3 onion services that support stronger algorithms authentication and encryption (SHA3/ed25519/curve25519 vs. RSA1024). https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt (MITIG168), use e2e (MITIG140). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.