Unknown vulnerabilities in Python or libraries used by SecureDrop accepted
THREAT38
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:678
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
Unknown vulnerabilities in Python libraries use could lead to code execution or denial of serviceon the app server
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| AppArmor on Tor MITIG1 | implemented |
| AppArmor on Apache MITIG2 | implemented |
| Use of grsecurity-hardened kernels on servers MITIG53 | implemented |
| Use of OSSEC monitoring software MITIG5 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Move SecureDrop to a compiled, memory-safe language like Rust to reduce likelihood of code injection/modification MITIG175 proposed
Residual risk
Risk is accepted.
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.
Source submission · Source Interface
Supply chain and dependencies · Source Interface
Notes
In scope: No. Existing mitigations: grsecurity/PaX linux patches prevent the exploitation of certain memory-corruption attacks (MITIG53). AppArmor profiles further reduce process capabilities through Mandatory Access Control (MITIG1, MITIG2). OSSEC is used for intrusion detection/file integrity monitoring (MITIG5). Further mitigations: Consider moving SecureDrop to a compiled, memory-safe language like Rust to reduce likelihood of code injection/modification (MITIG175). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.