Transfer device tampered inform Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT46
· Inform: Handled by telling users how to protect themselves.
· Defined in catalog.py:818
- Risk
- Low impact × Very Low likelihood = 1 low
- After mitigations
- Low impact × Very Low likelihood = 1 low (unchanged)
An adversary or law enforcement gains possession of the transfer device and introduces malware on the transfer tick
Threat actors: Any
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Persistent FDE Storage of Transfer Device MITIG57 Legacy (Tails/SVS) | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Transfer devices should be regularly sanitized - e.g. after each use. MITIG154 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
- Admin guide should speak clearly to physical security considerations MITIG115 proposed
- Tamper-evident stickers/bags MITIG116 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
- Transfer Device Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Transfer & decrypt Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Transfer Device
Notes
Existing mitigations: Transfer stick is encrypted using LUKS (MITIG57). Further mitigations: Possible mitigations inform users to wipe transfer sticks before each use, have one transfer stick per journalist which is stored with their journalist Tails stick, use new Transfer devices for each transfer to the SVS (MITIG154), use safe location (MITIG115) and/or tamper-evident bags for storage (MITIG116). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.