Compromise package build servers mitigated
THREAT51
· Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level.
· Defined in catalog.py:910
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
Should an adversary compromise the workstation on which APT packages are built for each release, they may be able to introduce malicious code in an update to the SecureDrop servers.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| All SecureDrop and tor releases (Release file and tag) signed with airgapped key MITIG46 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Reproducible builds MITIG162 proposed
- Dedicated secure build machine MITIG163 proposed
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Supply chain and dependencies · SecureDrop release & package build
Notes
Existing mitigations: Builds are independently validated by multiple developers. Release files containing hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) of Package file and package hashes are signed with an airgapped GPG key. (MITIG46). Further mitigations: Provide build reproducability for packages served by the FPF APT repository to allow independent validation of built packages (MITIG162). Build on dedicated secure machine (MITIG163). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.