Compromise package build servers mitigated

THREAT51 · Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level. · Defined in catalog.py:910

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

Should an adversary compromise the workstation on which APT packages are built for each release, they may be able to introduce malicious code in an update to the SecureDrop servers.

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
All SecureDrop and tor releases (Release file and tag) signed with airgapped key MITIG46 implemented

Possible further mitigations

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.

Supply chain and dependencies · SecureDrop release & package build

Notes

Existing mitigations: Builds are independently validated by multiple developers. Release files containing hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) of Package file and package hashes are signed with an airgapped GPG key. (MITIG46). Further mitigations: Provide build reproducability for packages served by the FPF APT repository to allow independent validation of built packages (MITIG162). Build on dedicated secure machine (MITIG163). Automated test for mitigation: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.