SecureDrop APT servers are compromised or APT server man-in-the middle attack with malicious packages. mitigated

THREAT54 · Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level. · Defined in catalog.py:960

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low

How statuses and scores work

An adversary that compromises APT server could serve potentially malcious .deb files (securedrop*, tor, or Linux image packages)

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation ISP

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
All SecureDrop and tor releases (Release file and tag) signed with airgapped key MITIG46 implemented
tag verified before building debian packages MITIG227 implemented

Residual risk

Hash collision

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 3 scenarios.

Updates, time & DNS · FPF apt repository
Supply chain and dependencies · FPF apt repository
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · FPF apt repository

Notes

Existing mitigations: SecureDrop updates are packaged in a .deb file and served through FPF's apt repo. Release files containing hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) of Package file and package hashes are signed with an airgapped GPG key. Source code is validated/verified before packaging and signing the .deb. (MITIG46, MITIG227). Automated test for mitigation: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.