SecureDrop APT servers are compromised or APT server man-in-the middle attack with malicious packages. mitigated
THREAT54
· Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level.
· Defined in catalog.py:960
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low
An adversary that compromises APT server could serve potentially malcious .deb files (securedrop*, tor, or Linux image packages)
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation ISP
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| All SecureDrop and tor releases (Release file and tag) signed with airgapped key MITIG46 | implemented |
| tag verified before building debian packages MITIG227 | implemented |
Residual risk
Hash collision
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 3 scenarios.
Updates, time & DNS · FPF apt repository
Supply chain and dependencies · FPF apt repository
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · FPF apt repository
Notes
Existing mitigations: SecureDrop updates are packaged in a .deb file and served through FPF's apt repo. Release files containing hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) of Package file and package hashes are signed with an airgapped GPG key. Source code is validated/verified before packaging and signing the .deb. (MITIG46, MITIG227). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.