Landing page source control is compromised inform
THREAT57
· Inform: Handled by telling users how to protect themselves.
· Defined in catalog.py:1007
- Risk
- High impact × High likelihood = 12 high
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
Organisation's SD landing page source repository is compromised, resulting in an attacker altering contents of the page, such as the link to their own malicious SecureDrop Instance, or injecting resources in an attempt to deanonymise a user
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Landing page deployment guide explains some security best practices for the webserver hosting the onion URL MITIG103 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Alerts sent to admins and FPF when onion URLs change on landing pages (from monitoring via multiple Tor circuits and physical locations) MITIG104 proposed
Residual risk
Administrator error or omission
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Source discovery and OPSEC · Landing page
Notes
Existing mitigations: Securedrop deployment guide: https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/deployment_practices.html?page#landing-page (MITIG103). Further mitigations: FPF Landing page scanner could be used to verify the integrity of the page and alert on changes (MITIG104). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.