Landing page host is compromised inform
THREAT58
· Inform: Handled by telling users how to protect themselves.
· Defined in catalog.py:1025
- Risk
- High impact × High likelihood = 12 high
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
An attacker that has compromised the landing page's server can modify landing page contents, including onion address, leading the source to a potentially maliciously operated SecureDrop Instance. Attacker may also attempt injection of JavaScript or malware to identify the potential source.
Threat actors: Any
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Landing page deployment guide explains some security best practices for the webserver hosting the onion URL MITIG103 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Alerts sent to admins and FPF when onion URLs change on landing pages (from monitoring via multiple Tor circuits and physical locations) MITIG104 proposed
- Landing pages instruct users to compare onion URLs MITIG106 proposed
Residual risk
Administrator error or omission
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Source discovery and OPSEC · Landing page
Notes
Existing mitigations: Securedrop deployment guide: https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/deployment_practices.html?page#landing-page (MITIG103). Further mitigations: FPF should augment the SecureDrop landing page scoring tool with functionality to monitor the integrity of the landing page from multiple locations accross the internet (MITIG104). Documentation should be updated to suggest users to visit SecureDrop onion URL (secrdrop5wyphb5x.onion) and compare landing page onion addresses from news organizations to those of the SecureDrop directory (MITIG106). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.