Monitor server is compromised accepted
THREAT66
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:1158
- Risk
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium (unchanged)
Due to limited attack surface (only SSH is exposed through an authenticated Tor hidden service) and port 1515 only locally to app server, if the monitor server is compromised, we should assume the app server is as well. Mon server also makes outbound calls to SMTP relay.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| ATHS token for connecting to servers via SSH MITIG60 | optional |
| Use of external dedicated hardware firewall MITIG21 | implemented |
| Restrictive iptables rules on servers MITIG182 | implemented |
| Nighly security update MITIG165 | implemented |
| Use of grsecurity-hardened kernels on servers MITIG53 | implemented |
| AppArmor on Tor MITIG1 | implemented |
| AppArmor on Apache MITIG2 | implemented |
| Use of OSSEC monitoring software MITIG5 | implemented |
Residual risk
Risk is accepted
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Physical and host layer · Monitoring Server (host)
Notes
Existing mitigations: mon server should only exposes SSH via Tor hidden service (MITIG60). All other traffic should be blocked by firewall (MITIG21, MITIG182). FPF performs vulnerability management for software dependencies as well automatic nightly updates for dependencies and OS packages (MITIG165). grsecurity/PaX linux patches prevent the exploitation of certain memory-corruption attacks (MITIG53). AppArmor profiles further reduce process capabilities through Mandatory Access Control (MITIG1, MITIG2). OSSEC is used for intrusion detection/file integrity monitoring (MITIG5). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.