Monitor server is compromised accepted

THREAT66 · Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk. · Defined in catalog.py:1158

Risk
Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium
After mitigations
Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

Due to limited attack surface (only SSH is exposed through an authenticated Tor hidden service) and port 1515 only locally to app server, if the monitor server is compromised, we should assume the app server is as well. Mon server also makes outbound calls to SMTP relay.

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
ATHS token for connecting to servers via SSH MITIG60 optional
Use of external dedicated hardware firewall MITIG21 implemented
Restrictive iptables rules on servers MITIG182 implemented
Nighly security update MITIG165 implemented
Use of grsecurity-hardened kernels on servers MITIG53 implemented
AppArmor on Tor MITIG1 implemented
AppArmor on Apache MITIG2 implemented
Use of OSSEC monitoring software MITIG5 implemented

Residual risk

Risk is accepted

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.

Physical and host layer · Monitoring Server (host)

Notes

Existing mitigations: mon server should only exposes SSH via Tor hidden service (MITIG60). All other traffic should be blocked by firewall (MITIG21, MITIG182). FPF performs vulnerability management for software dependencies as well automatic nightly updates for dependencies and OS packages (MITIG165). grsecurity/PaX linux patches prevent the exploitation of certain memory-corruption attacks (MITIG53). AppArmor profiles further reduce process capabilities through Mandatory Access Control (MITIG1, MITIG2). OSSEC is used for intrusion detection/file integrity monitoring (MITIG5). Automated test for mitigation: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.