Watering hole attack on client mitigated
THREAT80
· Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level.
· Defined in catalog.py:1410
- Risk
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × Very Low likelihood = 2 low
An adversary may introduce malicious code on a compromised SecureDrop instance to deanonymize SecureDrop sources and learn their real IP (Freedom Hosting-like attack)
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Tor security slider set to high MITIG67 | optional |
Possible further mitigations
- Landing pages instruct sources to disable Javascript MITIG234 proposed
Residual risk
An attacker could disable the warning that tells the source to disable JavaScript.
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Source discovery and OPSEC · Source Tor Browser
Notes
Existing mitigations: Sources are instructed to disable JavaScript. This is how watering hole attacks have been done by the FBI against other onion services, e.g. Freedom Hosting. See https://www.wired.com/2016/05/history-fbis-hacking/ for more details on that. (MITIG67). Further mitigations: Strong guidance on landing pages themselves to disable JavaScript in Tor Browser. (MITIG234). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.