Transfer device seized/stolen/lost inform Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT81
· Inform: Handled by telling users how to protect themselves.
· Defined in catalog.py:1428
- Risk
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium (unchanged)
An adversary or law enforcement gains possession of the transfer device
Threat actors: Any
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Persistent FDE Storage of Transfer Device MITIG57 Legacy (Tails/SVS) | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Transfer devices should be regularly sanitized - e.g. after each use. MITIG154 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
Residual risk
Administrator or journalist error (e.g. weak passphrase, no encryption), admin/journalist keeps passphrase on physical documents
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
- Transfer Device Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Transfer & decrypt Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Transfer Device
Notes
Existing mitigations: Admin guide states that device be encrypted using LUKS (MITIG57). Further mitigations: Provide further documentation to Journalists/admins to wipe/destroy transfer devices after each use (MITIG154). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.