DNS partially mitigated
THREAT85
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:1473
- Risk
- High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high
- After mitigations
- High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high (unchanged)
An attacker with a privileged network position could spoof/tamper DNS response and cause DoS or attempt to MiTM network connections.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Source interface only available as a Tor onion service MITIG54 | implemented |
| Journalist interface only available as a Tor onion service MITIG55 | implemented |
| Admin interface traffic goes over Tor MITIG96 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- DNS over TLS MITIG90 proposed
- Apt traffic over Tor MITIG91 proposed
- Use authenticated version of NTP to harden against e.g. DNS attacks - tlsdate? research needed here MITIG97 proposed
Residual risk
Candidate for further mitigation efforts
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Updates, time & DNS · DNS resolver
Notes
Existing mitigations: Most traffic is routed over Tor Hidden services (end-to-end encrypted) (MITIG54, MITIG55, MITIG96). Only clearnet traffic is Apt (where packages are GPG-signed), DNS, NTP, and mail (GPG-encrypted). Further mitigations: DNS over tls (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7858/) (MITIG90), send apt traffic over Tor (MITIG91), harden NTP (MITIG97). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.