Configuration vulnerability in Journalist interface mitigated
THREAT9
· Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level.
· Defined in catalog.py:168
- Risk
- Medium impact × Medium likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × Medium likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
Misconfiguration of the SecureDrop instance may facilitate or introduce vulnerabilities in the application or infrastructure.
Threat actors: Any
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Config managed by securedrop-client sdconfig CLI tool MITIG240 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Improve UX for admins / configuration management MITIG242 proposed
- Instruct admins not to modify config by hand MITIG62 proposed
- Prevent admins from undoing each other's site-specific changes MITIG241 proposed
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.
Source submission · SecureDrop Application
Physical and host layer · SecureDrop Application
Notes
Existing mitigations: All components are up to date with proper security configuration and versions. Configuration is tracked in the SecureDrop source repository, and installation-specific configuration is found in install_files/ansible-base/group_vars/all/site-specific and modified by securedrop-admin sdconfig (MITIG240). Further mitigations: Improve config story for SecureDrop (this is ticket https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop/issues/1966), and improve UX around modifying server config (https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop/issues/344) (MITIG242). Discourage admins from modifying state by hand (MITIG62). Prevent admins from overwriting each other's config changes (MITIG241). Automated test for mitigation: Yes.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.