Source visits torproject.org accepted
THREAT91
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:1587
- Risk
- Medium impact × High likelihood = 8 high
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × High likelihood = 8 high (unchanged)
User/prospective source visiting torproject.org may raise suspicion from an adversary. torproject.org might be blocked/unavailable, increasing the chance a user would access the landing page without using the Tor Browser.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation ISP
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Possible further mitigations
- Source guide contains some OPSEC considerations MITIG86 implemented
- Landing pages also describe in detail the safest ways to get Tor MITIG89 proposed
- Host latest TB binary on landing pages so no traffic goes to torproject.org MITIG108 proposed
Residual risk
Candidate for further mitigation efforts
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Source discovery and OPSEC · Source Tor Browser
Notes
Existing mitigations: Securedrop source guide: https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/source.html. Further mitigations: Source guide should be updated to suggest the potential source use Tor soon as possible in the process (MITIG86). Should also suggest the use of public networks to download Tor. Potential sources may also download Tor from GitHub: https://github.com/TheTorProject/gettorbrowser or via email by sending windows,osx or linux to gettor@torproject.org. In the latter case, users should be mindful of who their mail provider is (MITIG89). Host latest TB binary and sig on landing page so no direct traffic goes to torproject.org (MITIG108). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.