SecureDrop server identification out of scope
THREAT93
· Out of scope: Outside what this threat model covers.
· Defined in catalog.py:1622
- Risk
- Medium impact × High likelihood = 8 high
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × High likelihood = 8 high (unchanged)
During install and nightly updates, app and mon servers call apt.freedom.press torproject.org for package updates. All other traffic occurs over Tor, may be unusual and easy to distinguish for the organization.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Possible further mitigations
- Encourage adoption of Tor within the news organization MITIG111 proposed
- Apt traffic over Tor MITIG91 proposed
- Honeypot/dummy SD servers MITIG112 proposed
- Use a VPN before connecting to the Tor network MITIG113 proposed
Residual risk
Candidate for further mitigation efforts.
Where it applies
Applies to 2 components in 1 scenario.
Physical and host layer · Application Server (host), Monitoring Server (host)
Notes
Further mitigations: Encourage adoption of Tor within the organization to 'normalize' Tor traffic (MITIG111). FPF repos served over Tor (MITIG91). FPF/volunteers could also run some honeypot SD servers that serve no purpose (MITIG112). Use a VPN before connecting to the Tor network (MITIG113). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.