SecureDrop server identification out of scope

THREAT93 · Out of scope: Outside what this threat model covers. · Defined in catalog.py:1622

Risk
Medium impact × High likelihood = 8 high
After mitigations
Medium impact × High likelihood = 8 high (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

During install and nightly updates, app and mon servers call apt.freedom.press torproject.org for package updates. All other traffic occurs over Tor, may be unusual and easy to distinguish for the organization.

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation

Mitigations

No mitigations in place.

Possible further mitigations

Residual risk

Candidate for further mitigation efforts.

Where it applies

Applies to 2 components in 1 scenario.

Physical and host layer · Application Server (host), Monitoring Server (host)

Notes

Further mitigations: Encourage adoption of Tor within the organization to 'normalize' Tor traffic (MITIG111). FPF repos served over Tor (MITIG91). FPF/volunteers could also run some honeypot SD servers that serve no purpose (MITIG112). Use a VPN before connecting to the Tor network (MITIG113). Automated test for mitigation: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.