Admin laptop tampered partially mitigated Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT95
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:1655
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
An adversary seizes the Administrator's Tails workstation and introduces an implant.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| SecureDrop hardware encouraged to be stored in a secure room / safe / environment MITIG114 Legacy (Tails/SVS) | optional |
Possible further mitigations
- Admin guide should speak clearly to physical security considerations MITIG115 proposed
- Tamper-evident stickers/bags MITIG116 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
- Chassis intrusion detection MITIG117 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
Residual risk
Not uniformly applied across organizations.
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
- Admin Workstation (device) Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Workstation lifecycle and backups Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Admin Workstation (device)
Notes
Existing mitigations: Organizations are encouraged to store admin laptops in secure rooms / locations (MITIG114). Further mitigations: Admin guide should emphasize on physical security of admin workstation (MITIG115), and suggest tamper-evident mechanisms for admin workstations (tamper-evident stickers/bags) (MITIG116). Some laptops have chassis intrusion detection, which combined with a power-on password may also provide extra assurance (MITIG117). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.