Admin Tails USB stick tampered accepted Legacy (Tails/SVS)
THREAT97
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:1690
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
An adversary tampers the Administrator's Tails USB stick and inserts malware
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Possible further mitigations
- Tamper-evident stickers/bags MITIG116 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
- Admin guide should speak clearly to physical security considerations MITIG115 proposed
- Admin guide explains incident response when admin tails key is tampered with / compromised MITIG141 Legacy (Tails/SVS) proposed
Residual risk
Candidate for further mitigation efforts.
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
- Admin Workstation (device) Legacy (Tails/SVS)
Workstation lifecycle and backups Legacy (Tails/SVS) · Admin Workstation (device)
Notes
Further mitigations: Admin guide should emphasize on physical security of admin stick, and suggest tamper-evident mechanisms for admin sticks (bags) (MITIG116). Admins should be instructed to keep their sticks with them or in a secure location at all times (MITIG115). Inform users to immediately discard existing key and change Administrator credentials should there be any doubt that the Admin tails key was tampered. This includes SSH key and Authenticated tor hidden service cookies (MITIG141). Automated test for mitigation: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.