Evil maid attack on bootloader accepted
THREATQW13
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:3188
- Risk
- High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low
- After mitigations
- High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low (unchanged)
An attacker that obtains physical control of the workstation could modify parts of the bootloader to inject malware that will persist on boot
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Possible further mitigations
- Use coreboot on workstation MITIGQW9 proposed
Residual risk
Effective against bootloader-based evil maid attacks but maybe not against firmware-based attackes
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · Workstation bootloader
Notes
In scope for audit: No. Existing mitigations: Once you're sending agents to get physical access, you may as well just access the server room. Further mitigations: - Qubes anti evil maid feature - Workstation phsical security - coreboot and/or HEADS (MITIGQW9).
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.