Evil maid attack on firmware accepted
THREATQW14
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:3205
- Risk
- High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low
- After mitigations
- High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low (unchanged)
An attacker with that obtains physical control of the workstation could modify parts of the firmwares (BIOS/EFI, disk, network) to inject malware that will persist on boot. This applies to a laptop that is turned off.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Possible further mitigations
- Use coreboot on workstation MITIGQW9 proposed
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · Workstation firmware
Notes
In scope for audit: No. Existing mitigations: Once you're sending agents to get physical access, you may as well just access the server room. Further mitigations: - Instruct users to lock down bios settings to disable ports that provide DMA accesss. - Remove unnecessary hardware from the laptop, laptop physical security, coreboot and/or HEADS (MITIGQW9).
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.