Side-channel analysis or exfiltration of sd-viewer VM partially mitigated
THREATQW16
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:3241
- Risk
- High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low
- After mitigations
- High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low (unchanged)
Code executing in the DisplayVM can obtain information about the underlying host, and perform side-channel analysis (e.g. cryptanalysis via power/cpu/acoustic cryptanalysis to obtain submission key.)
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Use non-networked disposible VMs for opening all decrypted files. MITIGQW18 | implemented |
Residual risk
Full attack surface of a Linux host
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.
Workstation: reading submissions · sd-viewer (disposable VMs)
Workstation: export and print · sd-viewer (disposable VMs)
Notes
In scope for audit: No. Existing mitigations: Display VM is a disposable VM and is recreated for each submission (MITIGQW18), Qubes uses Xen-based HVM virtualization for VMs. Display VM does not have network access. Display VM is denied access to mic. Further mitigations: Decrease the time the VM is allowed to request decryption from the sd-gpg VM: side channel attacks reconstructing private keys require many decryptions (Genken, Shamir & Tromer 2013 was a CCA attack that required ~30k ciphertexts = an hour to reconstruct a 4096-bit RSA GPG key).
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.