Attacker obtains code execution in the sd-app VM mitigated

THREATQW18 · Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level. · Defined in catalog.py:3274

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low

How statuses and scores work

An attacker that can obtain code execution on the sd-app VM can observe all decrypted submissions, messages, and replies, as well as send replies to sources.

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
grsecurity in all Debian templates MITIGQW3 implemented

Possible further mitigations

Related threats

This threat is part of: MIME hander in sd-app doesn't handle submission format THREATQW8, Vulnerability introduced in provisioning code THREATQW15

Smaller threats that make up this one:

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.

Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)

Notes

Existing mitigations: - sd-app is a vault VM (no network connectivity) - grsec (MITIGQW3) - submissions are opened in a disposable VM. Further mitigations: Apply validation of API requests and responses to prevent an attacker that has successfully acquired code execution on the server from pivoting to the workstation (MITIGQW11).

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.