Attacker obtains code execution in the sd-app VM mitigated
THREATQW18
· Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level.
· Defined in catalog.py:3274
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low
An attacker that can obtain code execution on the sd-app VM can observe all decrypted submissions, messages, and replies, as well as send replies to sources.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| grsecurity in all Debian templates MITIGQW3 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Careful validation in SDK MITIGQW11 proposed
Related threats
This threat is part of: MIME hander in sd-app doesn't handle submission format THREATQW8, Vulnerability introduced in provisioning code THREATQW15
Smaller threats that make up this one:
- Privilege escalation (Xen vulnerability) THREATQW11 accepted
- Vulnerability in the QubesOS management layer THREATQW27 transferred
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.
Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
Notes
Existing mitigations: - sd-app is a vault VM (no network connectivity) - grsec (MITIGQW3) - submissions are opened in a disposable VM. Further mitigations: Apply validation of API requests and responses to prevent an attacker that has successfully acquired code execution on the server from pivoting to the workstation (MITIGQW11).
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.