DoS (Xen vulnerability) accepted
THREATQW3
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:3014
- Risk
- Low impact × Low likelihood = 2 low
- After mitigations
- Low impact × Low likelihood = 2 low (unchanged)
A process compromised virtual machine exploits a Xen vulnerability to cause a denial of service on the virtual machine
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Possible further mitigations
- Remove applications e.g. Tor Browser in Journalist VM (proxy VM) MITIGQW4 proposed
Where it applies
Applies to 9 components in 3 scenarios.
- sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
- sd-devices (export and print)
- sd-gpg
- sd-log
- sd-proxy
- sd-viewer (disposable VMs)
- sys-firewall
- sys-net
- sys-usb
Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-proxy, sys-firewall, sys-net, sd-gpg, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-devices (export and print), sys-usb, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Notes
Further mitigations: Instruct users to update dom0 and templates, vulnerability management/warnings around Xen exploits/Qubes updates. Harden VMs that process untrusted data and prevent code execution by malicious processes (MITIGQW4).
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.