Workstation laptop is seized/stolen partially mitigated

THREATQW30 · Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high. · Defined in catalog.py:3450

Risk
Medium impact × Medium likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
Medium impact × Medium likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

An attacker steals the SecureDrop Workstation from the news organization.

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation

Mitigations

No mitigations in place.

Possible further mitigations

Residual risk

If the laptop decryption key is known by the attacker, they can connect to the SecureDrop instance

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.

Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · Workstation hardware

Notes

Existing mitigations: QubesOS default install uses full-disk encryption. Journalists should not leave workstation on and unattended to be stolen by adversary. Workstation shuts down on lid close, to trigger FDE protections again. Further mitigations: - Admin should be able to terminate journalist sessions - Remote wipe feature - Consider using smartcard for GPG key (see also: https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2014/02/04/paper_yubikey_sca.pdf). (MITIGQW8) - API access to SecureDrop Journalist interface should use 2-Factor Authentication - Provide physical security documentation for storing the workstation. Do not take workstation to low security locations. Strongly recommend laptop stays in building. - Provide documentation for what to do in the event a laptop has been stolen (e.g. how to rotate all credentials, back up VMs) - Instruct users to shut down workstation when not in use - Force shutdown (MITIGQW32).

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.