Workstation laptop is seized/stolen partially mitigated
THREATQW30
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:3450
- Risk
- Medium impact × Medium likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × Medium likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
An attacker steals the SecureDrop Workstation from the news organization.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Possible further mitigations
- Use hardware token to store submission key MITIGQW8 proposed
- Force hard system shutdown instead of suspend/hibernate (https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation/issues/178) MITIGQW32 proposed
Residual risk
If the laptop decryption key is known by the attacker, they can connect to the SecureDrop instance
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · Workstation hardware
Notes
Existing mitigations: QubesOS default install uses full-disk encryption. Journalists should not leave workstation on and unattended to be stolen by adversary. Workstation shuts down on lid close, to trigger FDE protections again. Further mitigations: - Admin should be able to terminate journalist sessions - Remote wipe feature - Consider using smartcard for GPG key (see also: https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2014/02/04/paper_yubikey_sca.pdf). (MITIGQW8) - API access to SecureDrop Journalist interface should use 2-Factor Authentication - Provide physical security documentation for storing the workstation. Do not take workstation to low security locations. Strongly recommend laptop stays in building. - Provide documentation for what to do in the event a laptop has been stolen (e.g. how to rotate all credentials, back up VMs) - Instruct users to shut down workstation when not in use - Force shutdown (MITIGQW32).
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.