Evil maid attack on the operating system partially mitigated
THREATQW32
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:3482
- Risk
- High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
An attacker with that obtains physical control of the workstation could modify operating system binaries to inject malware that will persist on boot (e.g. /boot or xen.efi. (For firmware or bootloader-based attacks, see THREATQW25 or THREATQW14)
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Qubes - full disk encryption MITIGQW48 | implemented |
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · Qubes OS and Xen
Notes
Existing mitigations: QubesOS default install uses full-disk encryption (MITIGQW48). Further mitigations: Recommend the use of Qubes anti-evil maid or safeboot. Other tools like TPM2-TOTP provide boot integrity attestation.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.