Supply chain attack on Python dependencies, e.g. developer of Python dependency uploads malicious source or binary release (either intentionally or accidentally), PSF PyPI is compromised mitigated
THREATQW35
· Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level.
· Defined in catalog.py:3513
- Risk
- High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high
- After mitigations
- High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high (unchanged)
npm-event-stream scenario: developer of python dependency gives access to upload releases to a malicious individual, the developer is malicious themeselves, or their PyPI account credentials are compromised
Threat actors: Troll
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Supply chain and dependencies · SecureDrop source repository
Notes
Existing mitigations: Diff/changelog review of source tarball is done by one independent reviewer. We build wheels ourselves and mirror on our own PyPI mirror. Hashes are then pinned in VCS and used across dev/CI/build.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.