Supply chain attack on Python dependencies, e.g. developer of Python dependency uploads malicious source or binary release (either intentionally or accidentally), PSF PyPI is compromised mitigated

THREATQW35 · Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level. · Defined in catalog.py:3513

Risk
High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high
After mitigations
High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

npm-event-stream scenario: developer of python dependency gives access to upload releases to a malicious individual, the developer is malicious themeselves, or their PyPI account credentials are compromised

Threat actors: Troll

Mitigations

No mitigations in place.

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.

Supply chain and dependencies · SecureDrop source repository

Notes

Existing mitigations: Diff/changelog review of source tarball is done by one independent reviewer. We build wheels ourselves and mirror on our own PyPI mirror. Hashes are then pinned in VCS and used across dev/CI/build.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.