Adversary exploits gzip parsing to get code execution accepted

THREATQW37 · Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk. · Defined in catalog.py:3549

Risk
High impact × Very Low likelihood = 3 low
After mitigations
Medium impact × Very Low likelihood = 2 low

How statuses and scores work

e.g. exploit in gzip parsing to get code execution on the sd-app AppVM (since it's parsing the gzip files)

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
sd-client running in non networked VM MITIGQW20 implemented
grsecurity in all Debian templates MITIGQW3 implemented

Residual risk

Exfiltration is still possible via sending a reply to an attacker-controlled source using the SecureDrop API.

Related threats

This threat is part of: Vulnerability introduced in provisioning code THREATQW15, Attacker obtains code execution in proxy VM THREATQW23

Smaller threats that make up this one:

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.

Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)

Notes

Existing mitigations: gzip files are provided by a trusted server sd-app vm is non networked (MITIGQW20) - sd-app is running grsec kernels (MITIGQW3). Further mitigations: SecureDrop server should gzip each file individually, the file is sent to sd-viewer in gzipped format. File metadata (if required) could be read by inspecting the gzip file within the client. Improve data validation prior to extraction on client-side.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.