Plaintext submissions exfiltrated partially mitigated
THREATQW40
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:3596
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
Exfiltration of any data via journalist replies: An attacker with code execution in sd-app can exfiltrate arbitrary documents and messages through the client via replies. This could be a malicious journalist or any attacker who gets journalist creds. Send data to a fake source set up for this purpose.
Threat actors: Any
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| sd-proxy has server hardcoded MITIGQW36 | proposed |
| sd-client running in non networked VM MITIGQW20 | implemented |
Possible further mitigations
- Sign replies with submission key, verify signature server-side MITIGQW41 proposed
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.
Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
Notes
Existing mitigations: sd-proxy has hardcoded URL (MITIGQW36), sd-app is non-networked (MITIGQW20). Further mitigations: Sign replies with submission key, verify signature server side (MITIGQW41) Or, rate limit replies.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.