Attacker tampers with replies in sd-proxy accepted
THREATQW42
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:3613
- Risk
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium
- After mitigations
- Medium impact × Low likelihood = 4 medium (unchanged)
Force decryption of arbitrary files. Substitute or drops ciphertexts, manipulating communications.
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Possible further mitigations
- Sign replies with submission key, verify signature server-side MITIGQW41 proposed
- TLS layer between sd-app and server MITIGQW53 proposed
Related threats
This threat is part of: Attacker obtains code execution in proxy VM THREATQW23
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Workstation: reading submissions · sd-proxy
Notes
Further mitigations: Sign replies with submission key, verify signature server side (MITIGQW41), TLS layer between sd-app and server (flagged in X41 2026 audit SCRDR-CR-26-02, SCRDR-CR-26-0) (MITIGQW53).
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.