Inter-vm covert channels (e.g. CPU cache) used for exfiltration accepted

THREATQW48 · Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk. · Defined in catalog.py:3697

Risk
Unknown impact × Unknown likelihood = Unknown
After mitigations
Unknown impact × Unknown likelihood = Unknown (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/817

Mitigations

No mitigations in place.

Where it applies

Applies to 9 components in 3 scenarios.

Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-proxy, sys-firewall, sys-net, sd-gpg, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-devices (export and print), sys-usb, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · sd-gpg

Notes

In scope for audit: No.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.