Inter-vm covert channels (e.g. CPU cache) used for exfiltration accepted
THREATQW48
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:3697
- Risk
- Unknown impact × Unknown likelihood = Unknown
- After mitigations
- Unknown impact × Unknown likelihood = Unknown (unchanged)
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/817
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Where it applies
Applies to 9 components in 3 scenarios.
- sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
- sd-devices (export and print)
- sd-gpg
- sd-log
- sd-proxy
- sd-viewer (disposable VMs)
- sys-firewall
- sys-net
- sys-usb
Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-proxy, sys-firewall, sys-net, sd-gpg, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-devices (export and print), sys-usb, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Notes
In scope for audit: No.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.