Compromised VM spoofs log origin accepted

THREATQW56 · Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk. · Defined in catalog.py:3796

Risk
Low impact × Low likelihood = 2 low
After mitigations
Low impact × Low likelihood = 2 low (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

A compromised VM can send logs as another VM to sd-log, or stop sending logs all together. The source of the is inhered by the hostname of the calling VM through qubes-db

Threat actors: Any

Mitigations

No mitigations in place.

Residual risk

This is possible; Candidate for further mitigation efforts.

Where it applies

Applies to 9 components in 3 scenarios.

Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-proxy, sys-firewall, sys-net, sd-gpg, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-devices (export and print), sys-usb, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · sd-gpg

Notes

In scope for audit: No. Existing mitigations: This is mitigated, because we refactored the code not to trust the VM name as received.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.