Compromised VM spoofs log origin accepted
THREATQW56
· Accepted: The team has decided to live with this risk.
· Defined in catalog.py:3796
- Risk
- Low impact × Low likelihood = 2 low
- After mitigations
- Low impact × Low likelihood = 2 low (unchanged)
A compromised VM can send logs as another VM to sd-log, or stop sending logs all together. The source of the is inhered by the hostname of the calling VM through qubes-db
Threat actors: Any
Mitigations
No mitigations in place.
Residual risk
This is possible; Candidate for further mitigation efforts.
Where it applies
Applies to 9 components in 3 scenarios.
- sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
- sd-devices (export and print)
- sd-gpg
- sd-log
- sd-proxy
- sd-viewer (disposable VMs)
- sys-firewall
- sys-net
- sys-usb
Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-proxy, sys-firewall, sys-net, sd-gpg, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client), sd-devices (export and print), sys-usb, sd-viewer (disposable VMs), sd-log
Notes
In scope for audit: No. Existing mitigations: This is mitigated, because we refactored the code not to trust the VM name as received.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.