Attacker has temporary physical access to workstation laptop unmanaged
THREATQW59
· Unmanaged: No decision has been made about this threat yet.
· Defined in catalog.py:3843
- Risk
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
- After mitigations
- High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)
An attacker could try to tamper the boot partition which is unencrypted (Evil Maid Attack). To do so, without physically pulling out the hard drive, there is the need to to boot from al alternative mediom or access some kind of pre boot shell. Currently, it could be possible to use the "rescue" shell integrated in systemd or, when GRUB is available, chainload another bootloader from a removable media via the GRUB Shell.
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Use safeboot or qubes anti-evil-maid for measured boot (https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation/issues/602) MITIGQW50 | proposed |
| Use coreboot on workstation MITIGQW9 | proposed |
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · Workstation bootloader
Notes
Existing mitigations: BIOS Password currently endorsed in the documentation to prevent change in setting or boot order. Grub and rescue yet to be addressed. Further mitigations: https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation-security/issues/2.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.