Attacker has temporary physical access to workstation laptop unmanaged

THREATQW59 · Unmanaged: No decision has been made about this threat yet. · Defined in catalog.py:3843

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

An attacker could try to tamper the boot partition which is unencrypted (Evil Maid Attack). To do so, without physically pulling out the hard drive, there is the need to to boot from al alternative mediom or access some kind of pre boot shell. Currently, it could be possible to use the "rescue" shell integrated in systemd or, when GRUB is available, chainload another bootloader from a removable media via the GRUB Shell.

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Use safeboot or qubes anti-evil-maid for measured boot (https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation/issues/602) MITIGQW50 proposed
Use coreboot on workstation MITIGQW9 proposed

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.

Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · Workstation bootloader

Notes

Existing mitigations: BIOS Password currently endorsed in the documentation to prevent change in setting or boot order. Grub and rescue yet to be addressed. Further mitigations: https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation-security/issues/2.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.