Attacker has temporary physical access to workstation laptop and can disassemble it partially mitigated

THREATQW60 · Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high. · Defined in catalog.py:3857

Risk
High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high
After mitigations
High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high (unchanged)

How statuses and scores work

An attacker could remove th hard disk and tamper the unencrypted boot partition (Evil Maid Attack)

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Use safeboot or qubes anti-evil-maid for measured boot (https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation/issues/602) MITIGQW50 proposed
Use coreboot on workstation MITIGQW9 proposed

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.

Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · Workstation hardware

Notes

Existing mitigations: SecureDrop Workstation documentation suggest enabling physical anti-tampering setting in BIOS. It is not bulletproof, and can theoretically be bypasses, but it should detect tampering at least for the less sophisticated versions of such attacks (Large Corporation / Basic Law Enforcement). Further mitigations: https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation-security/issues/2.

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.