Attacker has temporary physical access to workstation laptop and can disassemble it partially mitigated
THREATQW60
· Partially mitigated: Some controls are in place, but the risk is still too high.
· Defined in catalog.py:3857
- Risk
- High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high
- After mitigations
- High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high (unchanged)
An attacker could remove th hard disk and tamper the unencrypted boot partition (Evil Maid Attack)
Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|
| Use safeboot or qubes anti-evil-maid for measured boot (https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation/issues/602) MITIGQW50 | proposed |
| Use coreboot on workstation MITIGQW9 | proposed |
Where it applies
Applies to 1 component in 1 scenario.
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · Workstation hardware
Notes
Existing mitigations: SecureDrop Workstation documentation suggest enabling physical anti-tampering setting in BIOS. It is not bulletproof, and can theoretically be bypasses, but it should detect tampering at least for the less sophisticated versions of such attacks (Large Corporation / Basic Law Enforcement). Further mitigations: https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation-security/issues/2.
How this threat is matched
Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.