GPG VM (sd-gpg) performs attacker file decryption mitigated

THREATQW7 · Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level. · Defined in catalog.py:3084

Risk
High impact × Low likelihood = 6 medium
After mitigations
Low impact × Low likelihood = 2 low

How statuses and scores work

An attacker with control of a VM that has access to the sd-gpg vm may arbitrarily decrypt files by requesting the GPG VM to decrypt.

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement

Mitigations

No mitigations in place.

Possible further mitigations

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.

Workstation: reading submissions · sd-gpg
Workstation: boot, provisioning and updates · sd-gpg

Notes

Existing mitigations: Qubes RPC policy restricts GPG access to the sd-svs VM exclusively. All other requests from other domains are denied by default. Further mitigations: Qubes can always ask for permission to decrypt. Enable passphrase for GPG key, move GPG key on physical token (MITIGQW8), Qubes RPC policy to deny (MITIGQW15), Validate GPG payload (MITIGQW16).

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.