Injection vulnerability in securedrop-client mitigated

THREATQW9 · Mitigated: Controls in place bring the risk down to an acceptable level. · Defined in catalog.py:3117

Risk
High impact × Medium likelihood = 9 high
After mitigations
Low impact × Low likelihood = 2 low

How statuses and scores work

By submitting a message to a SecureDrop instance, an attacker an inject malicious markup or code inside the securedrop-client message view once it is downloaded and displayed on screen. An attacker could then either cause a user to perform an action or attempt to obtain code execution on sd-app.

Threat actors: Nation State / Law Enforcement Large Corporation

Mitigations

Mitigation Status
Use non-networked disposible VMs for opening all decrypted files. MITIGQW18 implemented

Possible further mitigations

Where it applies

Applies to 1 component in 2 scenarios.

Workstation: reading submissions · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)
Workstation: export and print · sd-app (SecureDrop Client)

Notes

Existing mitigations: sd-app is airgapped making exfiltration difficult. Testing suggests that while the link works in dev env, it does not work in Qubes. Any link should be opened in a disposable, airgapped VM (MITIGQW18). Further mitigations: Use Jinja to escape any potential markup (MITIGQW17).

How this threat is matched

Listed for these components. A boundary covers every component inside it.